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More and better engagement with working class neighbor-hoods and communities of color are urgent imperatives 
for the planning profession as the United States transitions to 
a “majority minority” population. Code enforcement personnel 
are already doing much of this work, normally in a much more 
collaborative and less heavy-handed manner than the name 
of their profession would suggest. However, at present the 
planning profession largely holds code enforcement at arms’ 
length. Using the example of the informal housing market in 
Southern California—managed on a daily basis by code en-
forcement officers, yet largely unaddressed by planners—we 
draw on survey and interview data and our own professional 
experiences to make four propositions about code enforce-
ment work. These are that code enforcement work is unusually 
cumbersome; it is chronically understaffed; its personnel cope 
by working reactively rather than proactively; and the pro-
fession suffers low prestige as a result. We argue that ending 
the estrangement between code enforcement and planning 
would offer numerous benefits to the latter, including incul-
cating cultural competence in planners through “learning by 
doing” and working at street level, and injecting sorely needed 
“community data” (Issac, 2013) into efforts to address vexing 
issues such as housing unaffordability.
Introduction
Recently a homeowner in Florence-Firestone, an unincorporat-
ed community about seven miles south of downtown Los An-
geles, converted his garage into an apartment without proper 
permits. A short time later, he was paid a visit from a zoning 
inspector, who notified him that the county had received a re-
port of an illegal garage conversion. He was then asked for per-
mission to inspect it. In some similar cases residents demand to 
know who complained (confidentiality requirements prevent 
disclosure); sometimes they bark “Get a warrant!” and slam the 
door shut; occasionally they become emotional. But as is most 
often the case, this homeowner simply cooperated and allowed 
access. The inspector then photographed the bedroom, kitch-
en, and bathroom built inside the garage. Having confirmed 
the violation, he explained how the unpermitted apartment 
violates zoning laws that require on-site covered parking, and 
building codes that prohibit living in an unauthorized dwelling 
without permitted gas, plumbing, and electrical service. After 
his visit, the inspector mailed a notice specifying each zoning 
code violation and a correction period. The notice also noted 
the consequences of noncompliance, which included hefty 
fines and a potential criminal case filing. As is typical, the home-
owner complied and the case was eventually closed.
A similar scene plays out daily in cities and counties across 
California. Most jurisdictions employ code enforcement officers 
or building inspectors to perform this municipal enforcement 
function. But in this case in Florence-Firestone, the official 
making the inspection was a Los Angeles County urban planner.
Sometime in the 1970s, L.A. County transitioned to hiring plan-
ners to perform zoning code enforcement. The impetus for 
the change was the realization that planners possess a robust 
knowledge base in zoning, politics, socioeconomics, commu-
nity development, and problem-solving, and that they would 
be well-positioned to educate community members about the 
complex permitting process. As a result, an L.A. County planner 
who begins her career in code enforcement develops strong 
community partnerships. She inevitably gains crucial aware-
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ness of what is happening “on the ground,” leading to better 
understanding of which zoning codes and land use policies are 
working and which are not. Her in situ knowledge is eventu-
ally translated into new ordinances and policies. Communities 
also benefit from having these “embedded planners” who work 
closely with stakeholders on improving quality of life. But the 
planner-as-code enforcement inspector remains the exception 
to the rule. Things do not work this way in most California plan-
ning departments. 
In general, the discipline of code enforcement is kept at arm’s 
length by the broader planning profession. In this article we ar-
gue that this constitutes a missed opportunity for the planning 
profession to “up its game.” This is particularly problematic in 
low-income neighborhoods and communities of color that are 
home to the nonwhite soon-to-be majority of the US popula-
tion (and present-day California majority). To do so, we examine 
the issue of widespread informal housing in Southern Califor-
nia—one confronted daily at street level by code enforcement 
officers, but at present largely ignored by practicing planners.
Informal housing is an under-recognized and yet pervasive 
phenomenon in urban, suburban, and rural communities 
throughout Southern California. Although we firmly believe 
that unpermitted dwellings ought to be a matter of great con-
cern to planners, at present this vast, officially “unaccounted 
for” housing market is largely managed by code enforcement 
officers. They are classic “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980) 
who must muddle through contradictory imperatives. On the 
one hand, they are expected to uphold the “letter of the law” 
of zoning ordinances and building codes, however profoundly 
out of step with daily lived reality. On the other hand, they are 
often called upon to avoid heavy-handedly trampling on the 
lives of community members, particularly those left with few 
other options in an unforgiving housing market. 
And yet, as we will argue, code enforcement practitioners are 
largely shunned by the planning profession via both official 
policies that govern its institutions and by a set of widely held 
norms and beliefs. We believe this to be a hindrance to the 
planning profession’s oft-professed aspiration to meaning-
fully engage with members of disenfranchised communities. 
It is a missed opportunity to gather what has been referred to 
previously in the pages of Focus as “community data” (Isaac, 
2013). And it is a missed opportunity to deepen the training 
and subsequent effectiveness of planners who are beginning 
their careers. 
The rest of this article unfolds as follows. First, we briefly 
summarize past research that documents the chronically tight 
housing market conditions of Southern California, and the 
informal housing market that has sprung up as a result. We 
then give an overview of the code enforcement profession in 
California. Next, we describe the empirical methods used in this 
paper, including a survey with responses from 114 Southern 
California code enforcement officers. The heart of the article 
recounts four propositions gleaned from these methods. 
Building on the propositions, we then describe several 
specific ways in which the planning discipline as practiced 
in Southern California holds itself at arm's length from the 
code enforcement profession. These include exclusion from 
professional certification; a lack of coverage in academic 
curricula; and a pervasive disdain for street-level problem-
solving work, in contrast with the valorization of more abstract 
analysis. We close with a brief set of recommendations on how 
the planning profession could narrow the divide that presently 
separates it from code enforcement.    
A chronically tight housing market and informal housing 
in Southern California
It will come as no surprise to Focus readers that high housing 
costs are a longstanding and still intensifying concern in 
California. While statewide house prices were just 30% above 
the nationwide average in 1970, by 2015 they were 150% 
higher (California Legislative Analyst, 2015: 3). Average monthly 
rent is 50% higher in California than in the United States as a 
whole (ibid). Real incomes have increased nowhere near fast 
enough to avoid escalating housing cost burdens on the 
typical household. Meanwhile, rates of housing construction 
have plummeted since the 1970s, particularly in coastal areas 
(California Legislative Analyst, 2015: 11). 
What is much less well understood is that one of the ways 
Californians have coped with the collision of these forces has 
been the growth of informal housing. Informal housing exists 
outside the law by virtue of its noncompliance with zoning 
regulations and other laws. It is a phenomenon that has long 
been intensively studied in various settings, but has been 
largely associated with the developing world (Arnott, 2009). 
Recent research, including by the present authors, has begun 
to identify and describe informal housing processes underway 
today in the United States, particularly in Los Angeles (Mukhija, 
2014; Bell, 2014; Wegmann, 2015).
Informal housing in Southern California looks nothing like, for 
instance, the colonias populares of nearby Mexico or the chawls 
of faraway India. Part of the reason is that rather than being 
situated in contiguous communities, informal housing Southern 
California-style is most typically grafted onto neighborhoods 
originally subdivided as new suburban communities, where it 
assumes a variety of physical forms (Figure 1). These informal 
dwellings are all built without official permission or the benefit 
of inspection during and following construction.  
Overview of code enforcement
Efforts by governmental authorities to regulate noncompliant 
land uses have a deep history. Enforcement has existed in 
some form since the early days of cities (Sanderson, 1969; 
Underwood et al, 2012). Legal remedies against nuisance 
properties date back to English common law (Editors of 
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Figure 1: Common types of informal dwellings in Greater Los Angeles: 1) garages retrofitted to house people rather than cars; 
2) garden sheds converted to rental apartments; 3) recreational vehicles parked in driveways and yard areas used as permanent 
housing and connected to water and sewer lines; 4) travel trailers used for housing; 5) single-family houses subdivided into multiple 
units; and 6) freestanding dwellings added to backyards. Photos by Jonathan Pacheco Bell (1 to 4) and Erika Pinto (5 & 6).
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Fordham Law Review, 1961). These mechanisms serve as the 
foundation on which modern-day code enforcement is based. 
In the US, rapid urbanization in the decades after the Civil War 
accelerated the need to enact nuisance, building, zoning, and 
health laws aimed at maintaining order and public safety. For 
instance, in 1904, the City of Los Angeles adopted a “districting” 
ordinance that excluded laundries and washhouses from three 
newly created districts. Four years later, the city used this 
ordinance to create six new residence districts that prohibited 
numerous manufacturing businesses (Whittemore, 2010). 
Notwithstanding these beginnings, municipal code enforce-
ment in the US developed in earnest during the post-war pe-
riod, a time of population increases and city development in 
many places, including Greater Los Angeles. “The construction 
boom that followed World War II caused a rapid expansion of 
the big city code enforcement agencies and the creation of 
many new agencies in the suburbs and smaller cities” (Sander-
son, 1969: 185). In the 1960s, code enforcement was retooled 
as a mechanism for slum clearance in service of “urban re-
newal” in Los Angeles and other American cities (Greer, 1965; 
Marco and Mancino, 1969). 
Today, every California city and county has a regulatory depart-
ment responsible for enforcing local codes and ordinances. 
Department names range from Code Enforcement or Zoning 
Enforcement, to Code Compliance, to Neighborhood and Com-
munity Preservation. The variation in nomenclature reflects the 
different roles and expectations of code enforcement agen-
cies within their respective jurisdictions. Increasingly, code en-
forcement officers are expected to solve the myriad violations 
constituents report to government, from unlicensed home 
businesses, to improperly drained pool water, to unpermitted 
garage conversions and much more (Moore, 2007: 11).   
Methodology
Our arguments presented in this article rest on a three-legged 
methodological stool. The first is a Code Enforcement Officer 
Survey (“the Survey”), administered in the winter of 2013. Re-
sponses to a Web-driven survey instrument were solicited 
from code enforcement professionals working at least partially 
at street level (i.e., excluding those solely in a supervisory role) 
from all 205 incorporated and unincorporated local govern-
ments in the five counties including and surrounding Los An-
geles, plus San Diego County. Responses were first requested 
from a notice placed on the California Association of Code En-
forcement Officers (CACEO) listserv. Next, emails were sent to 
every e-mail address for code enforcement officers listed on-
line. Finally, postcards were mailed to every community from 
which at least one response had not already been received. 
The postcard mailings were repeated two additional times for 
communities whose officers had not provided at least one re-
sponse. These efforts yielded a total of 114 individual respons-
es representing 79 distinct incorporated and unincorporated 
jurisdictions. The Survey asked respondents to estimate the 
prevalence of unpermitted housing in the jurisdictions where 
they were employed, to answer questions about their work-
load, and to assess whether political interference, bureaucratic 
obstacles or other factors hindered their work. 
Our second method is interviews with code enforcement profes-
sionals. These occurred in two ways: first, the Survey invited 
respondents to provide further open-ended written commen-
tary. The other was six in-person and telephone interviews con-
ducted from the fall of 2012 to the spring of 2013 with code 
enforcement officers—in some cases singly and in others with 
groups—working in various communities in Los Angeles and 
Orange Counties. Some of these involved “ride alongs,” which 
entailed one of us (Wegmann) riding in a car with one or more 
code enforcement officers in the communities where they 
worked and attempting to understand the realities of their jobs. 
Our third method is direct and participant observation. One of us 
(Bell) has worked full-time as a planner and zoning enforcement 
inspector for Los Angeles County since 2006. The other 
(Wegmann) monitored email communications among code 
enforcement professionals on the CACEO listserv for over a year. 
How code enforcement officers cope with the informal 
housing market in Southern California
In this section, we rely on our findings from the three methods 
discussed above to put forth four propositions. Each of 
them concerns how code enforcement officers in Southern 
California navigate the complexities of their unintended roles 
as regulators of the informal housing market. The propositions 
build upon each other in sequence, culminating in the final 
one which helps explain code enforcement’s estrangement 
from the planning profession. 
Before we present the four propositions, a cautionary note is 
in order. The propositions constitute our best interpretation 
of the “big picture” emerging from the totality of our survey 
and interview results and, perhaps most importantly, profes-
sional experiences (in the case of coauthor Bell). Competing 
explanations for our results, or similar empirical findings from 
elsewhere, deserve further exploration. Given that code en-
forcement is so under-researched in the planning field, the 
emergence of critical perspectives, even those contrary to our 
own, would indicate an across-the-board increase in interest 
in this topic, and in our opinion would only be a positive out-
come. Bearing in mind these caveats, we now proceed with 
four propositions that sum up the relationship between code 
enforcement and planning in Southern California as we see it. 
Proposition #1: Code enforcement work is unavoidably painstak-
ing and cumbersome.
To complain that one’s work is difficult and time-consuming 
is likely universal, and there is no shortage of such complaints 
from professional planners. However, there are a number of 
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structural factors, which we believe are poorly understood, 
that must be pointed out to someone who wonders why code 
enforcement officers cannot always “just enforce the law.”
The first is that code enforcement work mostly takes place 
on private property. This contrasts with police work, where 
suspects are often contacted while in the public realm. In code 
enforcement, most cases concern people occupying private 
spaces to which they have ownership or at least access. Gaining 
entry to private property without the occupants’ consent in 
cases where there is no imminent threat to health and safety 
requires an inspection warrant from a judge. This is a time- and 
paperwork-intensive procedure. It is certainly true that code 
enforcement officers can often detect a potential code violation 
on the basis of what they can see from the public street, such 
as a garage that appears to be inhabited. However, in most 
instances investigating that suspected condition (deriving, for 
instance, from a complaint from a neighbor) requires gaining 
admittance to the interior of a private residence.
What is more, code enforcement officers must abide by the legal 
concept of the expectation of privacy. This means that they cannot 
act on conditions that they see if in order to observe them they 
had to use vantage points considered intrusive. For example, if 
a code enforcement officer were to visually gather evidence of 
an improperly inhabited garage by peering over a fence while 
standing on a milk carton in a neighboring yard, a judge would 
rule that the officer had violated the suspected homeowner’s 
expectation of privacy. Any photographic evidence would be 
inadmissible. This would result in the judge refusing to grant 
a warrant to enter the offending property, thus preventing 
the officer from acting on her hunch. For similar reasons, code 
enforcement officers cannot rely solely on satellite imagery from 
widely available sources like Google Maps as a legal basis for 
initiating an enforcement action. This is true even if unpermitted 
conditions are obvious when seen using such tools. 
As in our opening anecdote, most homeowners willingly grant 
access to their properties to code enforcement officers who 
request entry. However, a sufficiently determined, hostile and 
empowered homeowner can greatly increase the time and dif-
ficulty of an enforcement action brought by a code enforce-
ment officer. One of the side effects of these dynamics, in ad-
dition to increasing the burden on code enforcement officers 
and their departments, is that a large share of the unpermit-
ted buildings and occupancy conditions on private residential 
properties remain out of view as seen from the public street. 
In addition, a code enforcement officer’s ability to take action 
against a noncompliant homeowner is constrained by the need 
to follow sometimes onerous procedures. A quote from an L.A. 
County zoning enforcement inspector about the sequence 
of steps he follows when taking action on an unpermitted 
dwelling on a residential property makes this clear:  
We send a first NOV [Notice of Violation] typically giving 
30 days to abate [i.e., for the homeowner to remove 
Table 1: Reasons there is less code enforcement activity than 
respondent would prefer (percentage of respondents reporting), n=53
The reasons cited by Code Enforcement Survey respondents for why there 
is less code enforcement activity in their department than they would 
prefer. Only respondents who had previously indicated that they would 
prefer to see more enforcement activity in the jurisdiction for which 
they work were posed this question. Respondents could select multiple 
answers, which explains why the responses do not add up to 100%. 
Lack of staff capacity    81%
Pressure from elected officials or their staff  30%
Pressure from department leader  13%
Prefer not to say    8%
Pressure from staff from other departments 2%
Other     25%
the unauthorized unit.] Next we send a certified Final 
Order giving 15 days to abate plus an additional 15 
day appeal period. Now the violation has continued 
[past the original 30 day notice period] for 30+ days. 
We continue to do rechecks and if the "vios" [violations] 
remain, we send a certified Noncompliance Fee notice 
giving 15 days to pay [the] $704 fee. By the way, anytime 
a certified notice is returned undelivered we have to 
recreate it and post it at the property. More time drag. 
Now the case has been open for 45+ days. Whether or 
not they [the homeowners] pay, they still have to abate, 
and if they don’t we send a DA [District Attorney] referral 
notice. But now we have to write a lengthy report to the 
DA and include all the evidence, all the while trying to 
juggle new complaints, other cases, and the multitude of 
other planning projects we handle. So cases can drag on 
because violators don’t see swift action from [the code 
enforcement department]. These protocols are built into 
the zoning code so, we have no choice but to follow. 
Violators have the advantage.
Proposition #2: Code enforcement departments, particularly in 
low-income jurisdictions, tend to be chronically understaffed in 
relation to the volume of cases.
As shown in Table 1, by far the leading reason (cited by 81% 
of the respondents to this question) for a shortfall in enforce-
ment as perceived by the code enforcement officers respond-
ing to the Survey was a lack of staff capacity. A related theme 
that emerged from the interviews was that code enforcement 
officers are faced with far more zoning code violations, espe-
cially comparatively major ones such as garage conversions 
than they can possibly address. This is particularly true in low-
income areas. Unsurprisingly, all of the factors discussed under 
Proposition #1 above contribute to this reality. These could 
be termed the “supply side” of what one might call the code 
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enforcement gap. The gap arises because the “supply” of code 
enforcement capacity is greatly exceeded by the “demand” by 
local residents for enforcement cases to be opened. But the de-
mand side of the gap is equally formidable, especially within 
low-income jurisdictions. This is borne out by our data.
In the Survey, there were three questions in which respondents 
were asked to estimate the percentage of 1-4 unit properties in 
their territories for which: i) at least one unauthorized dwelling 
unit is present; ii) overcrowding, as defined by any applicable 
local ordinance or state or federal law, occurs; and iii) non-
compliant conditions of any sort are present. In Figure 2 the 
mean percentage of noncompliance estimates are shown 
according to the median family income (MFI) quintile of the 
city or unincorporated area covered by the respondent.1 For 
all three questions, responses were well distributed among the 
five income quintiles.2 
The results shown in Figure 2 show a clear trend. They are de-
rived from estimates reported by code enforcement officers, 
and thus should be interpreted with due caution. Nevertheless, 
there is a striking downward trend in property non-compliance, 
measured in the three different ways, with increasing jurisdic-
tion median family income. 
The prevalence rates for unpermitted units, as well as other 
non code-compliant conditions, are very high in relation to the 
staffing levels that would be needed to address most of them 
through enforcement. Two survey questions sought to gauge 
this code enforcement gap. When asked what percentage of 
non-code compliant (for any reason) 1-4 unit properties they 
had addressed in any way in the last 30 days, the respondents 
(n=73) reported an average of 38%. This percentage varied 
relatively little according to the income quintile of the 
jurisdiction. This suggests that the typical code enforcement 
officer has, at any given time, a backlog of just under two open 
cases concerning 1-4 unit residential properties for every one 
that she is actively pursuing in some way. Of course, this result 
tells us little about how large the officer’s actual backlog is 
in relation to the potential number of cases. As will become 
clear in our discussion of Proposition #3, the vast majority of 
potential enforcement cases never gain the attention of the 
local code enforcement department.
Proposition #3: Most code enforcement departments cope with 
high caseloads and low staffing by enforcing reactively rather 
than proactively.
All of the code enforcement officers interviewed, in addition 
to a great many of the Survey respondents providing written 
comments, highlighted the distinction between “proactive” 
and “reactive” code enforcement. In proactive enforcement, 
code enforcement officers drive on pre-determined routes 
and visually inspect properties from the public street to look 
for clues of violations. If any are found that are sufficiently 
apparent, officers open cases and pursue enforcement 
action. By contrast, reactive enforcement entails investigating 
complaints that are made by members of the public and other 
agencies, typically on anonymous telephone tip lines. 
Most code enforcement officers tend to view proactive 
enforcement as an ideal state, and reactive enforcement as a 
lamentable concession to the nature of their work. For instance, 
one anonymous survey respondent from a city in San Diego 
County, when asked why his/her3 department is not able 
to achieve as much enforcement activity as he/she would 
prefer, stated that it is “mostly because we are not proactive 
in our approach to code enforcement. For example, in driving 
around the city I can see garage conversions on virtually every 
residential block. But if we do not receive a complaint we do 
not pursue it.” 
The contrast between proactive and reactive code enforcement 
approaches is suggestive of the distinction Wilson (1978) made 
Figure 2: Percentages of residential (1-4 unit) properties estimated 
to have various non-code compliant conditions, as reported by 
respondents to the Code Enforcement Survey. Percentages are grouped 
according to the median family income quintile of the jurisdiction 
for which the respondent works. Multiple responses from the same 
jurisdiction are averaged together. 
3   The respondent’s actual gender is unknown.
1  While it was straightforward to look up the median family income 
for incorporated cities in the 2007-2011 American Community Survey, 
assigning median family incomes (MFIs) to unincorporated areas 
covered was less straightforward. To do so, we relied on responses to 
a question in which we asked survey respondents what their territory 
was. From this, we assigned officers to Census-Designated Places 
(CDPs, or unincorporated communities) and then calculated an overall 
MFI as the population-weighted average of the MFIs for the CDPs 
covered by the officer. Where we could not reconstruct the officer’s 
territory, we used the overall MFI for the entire unincorporated area of 
the county.
2  Response rates were relatively robust, though somewhat depressed 
for the question about overcrowding (with 74 responses compared 
to 89 and 91 for the other two questions). Written feedback from 
survey respondents suggests that this is because many jurisdictions 
have no specific definition or standards for what constitutes excessive 
occupancy of a residential space.
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between law enforcement and order maintenance in police 
work. The first is concerned with, to the extent possible, enforc-
ing the laws on the books. The latter is instead concerned with 
maintaining order and resolving disputes in the community, 
even at the cost of overlooking a multitude of infractions. 
In his in-depth research on 1960s-era police departments 
throughout the US, Wilson (ibid) identified three styles of 
police department management: the watchman style, which 
emphasizes order maintenance; the legalistic style, in which 
strict law enforcement is the aspiration; and the service style, 
in which police intervene frequently but often not formally. 
Because code enforcement officers have relatively little ability 
to intervene in disputes in real time, the service style is not 
a viable option. Thus, the watchman and legalistic styles, 
representing reactive and proactive enforcement, respectively, 
are the main poles in code enforcement work. 
The legalistic, or proactive, style of code enforcement appears 
to be more common in communities that are affluent, or that 
at least have high homeownership rates. In communities in 
the midst of a dramatic rise in the prevalence of unpermitted 
units and other non-code compliant conditions, the continued 
application of the legalistic style leads to extreme political 
tensions, disruption of neighborhoods, an erosion of trust 
among neighbors and between citizens and their elected 
officials, and widespread frustration over the ineffectuality 
of crackdowns. More commonly, in some cases following a 
period of turmoil, the watchman or reactive style is the path of 
political least resistance for elected officials.  
Where code enforcement is reactive, complaints become a 
vehicle through which code enforcement officers paradoxically 
uphold the norms of the underground housing market. This is 
how code enforcement officers are thrust into the somewhat 
strange position of essentially managing the local informal 
housing market they are officially charged with suppressing. 
In interviews and in our professional work we have frequently 
encountered disgruntled tenants. Some are dissatisfied with 
the condition of their unpermitted dwelling, and others are 
in conflict with the landlord over payment terms. The result 
can be anonymous calls to tip lines knowing full well that 
enforcement could lead to the tenant’s dwelling—and with it a 
portion of the landlord’s livelihood—being dismantled. 
In the absence of recourse to the dispute-resolution mechanisms 
that exist in the formal housing market, anonymous complaints 
are one of the few ways for community members to police the 
behavior of their neighbors who are acting as off-the-books 
landlords. By helping discourage extreme behavior, complaints 
ironically help perpetuate and legitimize the informal housing 
market. They do so via appeals to those who are officially 
devoted to shutting it down altogether, but who in reality 
simply manage it as best as they can.  
Proposition #4: The code enforcement profession suffers from low 
visibility and prestige.
Table 2: Number of survey responses by type of department 
containing code enforcement functions in jurisdiction (n=98)
The wide distribution of types of city or county departments housing 
code enforcement functions among Code Enforcement Survey responses. 
Note that separate responses received from more than one officer 
working for the same jurisdiction are only counted once in this table.
Building     5%
Development Services   8%
Economic/Community Development  40%
Housing     1%
Housing and Neighborhood Development 1%
Planning     28%
Public Safety    4%
Public Services    2%
Public Works    3%
Quality of Life    6%
Resource Management   2%
Total     100%
A consistent theme repeated by interviewed code enforcement 
officers was the relatively low public profile and prestige of 
the profession when compared to other professions, such as 
planning and particularly police work. A building inspector 
working for a predominantly working class city in Orange 
County noted that recruitment for code enforcement work can 
be difficult. This is particularly so since City Council members 
and others frequently criticize enforcement officers for being 
too strict or too lenient. Too much enforcement and officers 
are accused of being overly punitive and out of step with 
community norms. Too little, and they are accused of being 
insufficiently diligent and of allowing poor neighborhood 
conditions to fester. A quote anonymously received via the 
Survey from an officer employed by a blue-collar city in Los 
Angeles County is revealing:
This profession is highly political. I wish that I could 
speak to you more openly, but we have been hit hard 
with layoffs and do not enjoy the same prestige or value 
that public safety has. We are at-will employees that 
must always remember that when carrying out our jobs. 
The general public does not understand that we ARE 
public safety as well. We enforce building codes, fire 
codes, health codes and are the only department that 
handles quality of life issues. We must always be aware of 
our public image, sometimes deal with the media, deal 
with irate citizens and inspect potentially dangerous 
properties alone. We do not receive the same training as 
public safety does. 
As both a consequence and a cause of the low visibility of code 
enforcement, it is placed within highly varying institutional 
structures in Southern California cities and counties. As can 
be seen in Table 2, a summary of the types of departments 
in which respondents to the Survey worked, there is no 
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consistency about where code enforcement fits within a 
municipal government. 
While such institutional flexibility allows code enforcement 
to be tailored to the individual character of a given city or 
county, it also contributes to an amorphous character to the 
profession. In strong contrast to a police, or even a planning, 
department, the mission and raison d’etre of code enforcement 
are poorly defined.
One consequence of the low-visibility, low-profile nature of 
the code enforcement profession is political interference in its 
work. An officer who formerly worked for a city in Southeast 
Los Angeles County noted that politicians interfere with code 
enforcement work to a far greater extent than they do with 
the police, whose independence from city politics tends to 
be insisted upon by voters. An attorney specializing in code 
enforcement work stated that a jurisdiction’s enforcement 
approach depends on a great deal on its political “temperament.” 
In other words, the code enforcement profession appears 
to be seldom insulated from the political priorities of local 
elected officials. Public safety functions such as fire and police 
departments, while not immune from political interference, 
are likely to be more protected as a result of their greater levels 
of prestige among the general public.
Political interference appears to be quite common based 
on results from the Survey. Of 108 responses received from 
identifiable Southern California jurisdictions, 97 respondents 
answered a question about whether or not they would prefer 
for there to be more, less, or the same volume of enforcement 
activity taking place in their jurisdiction. Of the 97, 43% 
thought that current levels of enforcement were “about right,” 
a majority of 55% thought that there should be more, and only 
2% thought that there should be less. The 55% who thought 
that there should be more enforcement were then asked why 
there is not more: among these, the second and third most 
commonly stated reasons were pressure from elected officials 
and their staff (30%) and pressure from the leadership of the 
respondent’s own department (13%) (shown earlier in Table 
1). Thus, while it cannot be said that political interference is 
ubiquitous in Southern California, it certainly appears to be 
common.
Institutionally-specific ways that planning shuns code 
enforcement
In the introduction, we argued that through policies, norms 
and practices, the planning profession in Southern California 
deliberately keeps code enforcement at arm’s length. Below, we 
highlight the ways this separation is maintained. The examples 
are drawn from our experiences working in and researching 
code enforcement in the Greater Los Angeles region.
AICP membership denial
The American Planning Association (APA) offers an optional 
certification through the American Institute of Certified 
Planners (AICP). Earning membership in this professional 
credential program conveys a level of prestige and 
competency upon the practicing planner. Years of professional 
planning experience coupled with planning education must 
be demonstrated in the AICP application’s screening essays 
before one can sit for the exam. In 2008, a planner in the Zoning 
Enforcement section at L.A. County's Department of Regional 
Planning applied to take the AICP exam but was denied. The 
applicant possessed a graduate degree in planning and over 
two years of professional planning experience enforcing L.A. 
County’s zoning code. The applicant described his professional 
planning experience in the screening essays, and the responses 
focused on enforcement as code and plan implementation. He 
did not anticipate difficulties since his combined educational 
and professional experience seemed to exceed the minimum 
standards. But AICP evaluators disagreed, determining that 
work in Zoning Enforcement “does not constitute professional 
planning.” The application denial letter went on to say: 
While important, zoning enforcement officers do not take 
on the personal responsibility, initiative and judgment 
of professional planners. Zoning Enforcement does not 
lead to technical accomplishments such as new plans, 
developing new planning policy, drafting new codes or 
proactively developing new initiatives in anticipation 
of changing regional, community or neighborhood 
conditions. Zoning enforcement officers assist planners 
by enforcing what planners have implemented; they do 
not participate in the actual planning itself.4
Appeal letters from the applicant and County Planning Director 
were rejected.
Lack of code enforcement education in planning curriculum
Code enforcement is virtually non-existent in planning edu-
cation in California.5 A review of course offerings in the five 
Los Angeles area universities that award planning degrees6 
confirmed our colloquial knowledge from the field: municipal 
4  Contra the AICP reviewer’s argument, one of the co-authors of this 
paper (Bell) drew upon his zoning code enforcement experience to 
lead a comprehensive update to the L.A. County yard sale ordinance 
in 2015. The “on the ground” knowledge of the County’s extensive 
yard sale problem enabled the development of an enforceable 
ordinance that balanced the competing interests of yard sale 
vendors, “brick and mortar” businesses, and community members. 
5  One recent and commendable exception is UCLA professor Vinit 
Mukhija’s “Informal City” seminar. One of us (Bell) recently delivered 
a lecture on informal housing for this class. See Week 7 of the Spring 
2016 syllabus: http://164.67.121.27/files/UP/Syllabi/S16/219S16%20
Mukhija.pdf
6  We reviewed online course descriptions at the following five 
planning programs in the Greater Los Angeles region: University of 
California, Los Angeles; University of Southern California; University of 
California, Irvine; California State Polytechnic University, Pomona; and 
California State University, Northridge.
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code enforcement is rarely if ever discussed in the classroom 
of planners-in-training. This is standard practice in planning 
education despite the fact that the all-important value of “im-
plementation” is, we believe, synonymous with “enforcement.” 
Individuals interested in learning about code enforcement7 and 
code administration8 would have to pursue such education in 
non-planning programs at a handful of California community 
colleges9 and state universities around the US. Otherwise, the 
code enforcement function appears to be a topic anathema to 
planning curriculums. 
Street-level problem-solving work of code enforcement is 
considered “beneath” the work of desk-bound, office based 
(Ivory tower-like) planners
One of the authors (Bell) has personally witnessed dismissive at-
titudes towards code enforcement in the municipal workplace, 
at APA conferences, and during planning school-sponsored 
events, among other settings. Planning practitioners have 
scoffed at the idea of a planner doing zoning code enforce-
ment. “I didn’t go to planning school to do THAT,” is their com-
mon refrain. A common perception is that “real” planning work 
entails doing analysis, thinking, dreaming, writing, map-mak-
ing, communicating, advocating, and reviewing and stamp-
ing plans—all activities conducted indoors. Fieldwork is often 
taken to mean visiting a project site or attending a community 
meeting but not knocking on a homeowner’s door to ask about 
an unpermitted conversion of a garage into an apartment. In 
spite of a still-recovering economy, planning school graduates 
have balked at the idea of working in a code enforcement role. 
Some candidates turned down job offers at L.A. County upon 
learning their assignment would be in the enforcement section.
Conclusion
As the United States transitions towards becoming a majority-
minority society—a milestone that arrived decades ago 
in Southern California—meaningful engagement with 
communities of color to address pressing issues such as 
unaffordable housing becomes more essential each year. 
Within the planning profession, innovative approaches, such as 
James Rojas’ technique of collaborative community visioning 
via the playful usage of everyday objects, are emerging but 
many more are needed (Main, 2012). We have argued that one 
of these could be a rapprochement between planning and 
code enforcement. 
On its face, given that code enforcement by its very name 
suggests a heavy-handed governmental body imposing its 
will on a community, our suggestion might initially seem odd. 
However, as we have described in this article, code enforcement 
as it is actually practiced in Southern California usually differs 
greatly from police work, and resembles much more a praxis 
of community problem solving, however constrained by laws, 
local politics, and limited resources. 
“[H]istorically, code enforcement has been the planning 
profession’s unwanted step-child” (Fulton & Shigley, 2012, 
pp. 160). Yet, the code enforcement profession has a lot to 
contribute to the planning profession, much of which the 
latter desperately needs. This includes an ethic of learning 
by doing rather than simply analyzing data. As an inevitable 
byproduct, this entails gaining a much-needed street-level feel 
for neighborhoods and for the people who live in them. This 
“embedded governance” helps code enforcement officers—
and potentially planners—overcome their lack of cultural 
competency in the communities where they work. This is 
particularly vital for those who are from middle class or affluent 
backgrounds and who are working in and on behalf of working-
class neighborhoods and communities of color with which they 
are personally unfamiliar. 
A link to the code enforcement profession could also help 
planners create better codes and policies. The informal 
housing market provides a perfect example: when a city is 
contemplating updating a zoning ordinance, the question of 
whether and how enforcement will occur should be considered 
from the beginning of the process rather than following 
its passage. New policies that have never been considered, 
such as code revisions, graduated permitting, homeowner 
improvement loans, and others, may surface when code 
enforcement officers with access to “community data” are at 
the table (Isaac, 2013).
All of these potential benefits are already latent in code 
enforcement work occurring on a daily basis in Southern 
California and beyond. To realize them, the planning profession 
needs to take the first step of casting aside its collective stigma 
towards code enforcement work.
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